A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO WELFARISM
JACOB NUSSIM'

In response to Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico,
Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 279 (2006).

Welfarism is widely employed and debated not only among
philosophers, political scientists, and economists, but also increasingly
among legal scholars. However, not all legal scholars fully appreciate
this approach to social choice. For example, welfarism is commonly,
but wrongly, equated with utilitarianism. Recent contributions by
legal scholars-in particular, Kaplow and Shavell-considerably
advanced the understanding of welfarism.'
Professors Adler and
Sanchirico (hereinafter "the Authors") make another important
contribution. 2
They present the welfarist approach and its
mechanisms in simple terms, accompanied by illuminating examples.
They clarify the relationship between equity and welfarism, especially
contrasted with utilitarianism. Even without considering the Authors'
innovative arguments, their Article is undoubtedly valuable reading
material for welfarist and nonwelfarist legal scholars.
The Authors' key contribution is their discussion of ex ante versus
ex post assessment of social welfare. The starting point is that any
equity-regarding social welfare function may rank policy options
differently depending on the welfarist methodology selected: ex ante
or ex post. , An ex ante methodology would aggregate the expected

I am grateful to Adi Ayal and Gideon Parchomovsky for their helpful comments
and discussions.
I LOuIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). See
alw
Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and ncedainty: Theory and
LegalApplicalions, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 283 n3 (2006).
2 SeeAdler & Sanchiico, surna note 1.
Discussions of the ex ante and ex post methodologies can be found in Elchanan
Ben-Porath et al., On the Measurement qnequality under Uhncertainty, 75 J. ECON. THEORY
194, 194-96 (1997);John Broome, tUcertainty and Fairness, 94 ECON.J. 624, 624 (1984);
Peter A. Diamond, CardinalWee1,
IndividualisticEthics, and Inelpeqlsonal Coprnluson o?/
Utility: Comment, 75 J. POL. EcON. 765-66 (1967); Thibault Gajdos & Eric Maurin,
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utilities of individuals. An ex post approach, on the other hand,
would aggregate the actual utilities of individuals in the various (ex
post) states of the world, and then take an expectancy of the
aggregations. These two approaches to welfarism necessarily coincide
under utilitarianism, which is not an equity-regarding method of
social ranking. Under any equity-regarding welfarist method, these
approaches may rank various social choices differently.
The Authors argue that the ex post approach to social welfare is
preferable.' That is, if welfarism is adopted and equity (in the PigouDalton sense) is subscribed to, the ex post perspective is socially
superior. They conclude, then, that policymakers should evaluate
public policies according to the ex post approach, even though this
might require rejecting policies that would make everyone better off
from an ex ante perspective.
This Response adopts the Authors' axioms: (1) welfarism, and (2)
equity-regarding aggregation of utilities. It also adopts the Authors'
standpoint-i.e., it favors the ex post perspective of welfarism. :
However, it supports the opposite case as guidance to policymakers.
That is, although the ex post valuation of welfare is assumed to be
superior, most public policies should, in general, be guided by an ex
ante perspective. Moreover, this Response presents utilitarianism as a
feasible welfarist option for most public policy analyses, even under a
general ex post equity-regarding approach to social welfare.
The case is built by focusing on the compensation option,
following the Authors.I "Compensation" describes redistribution of
individuals' utilities. Compensation can be applied ex post to "repair"
or "rearrange" socially inappropriate distributions of utilities.
Assuming a proper compensation apparatus can be applied ex post
costlessly, the dilemma is solved:
ex ante policy evaluation is
permissible, even under the ex post approach, since its ex post unwanted
ramifications can be fixed costlessly when the (ex post) time comes.
Costless compensation makes us socially indifferent to the two
welfarist perspectives of policymaking. Yet, compensation schemes,

Unequal Uncertainiies and Unettain Inequalilies: An Axiomatic Approach, 116 J. ECON.
THEORY 93, 94 (2004); PeterJ. Hammond, Ex-Ante and Ex-Pst Welirje O1)ptaIlity under
Uncertairty, 48 ECONOMICA 235 (1981); Alon Harel et al., Ex-Posl Eg'alitaanisrn anmd
Legalfistice,21 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 57, 69 (2005).
See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 1, at Part
V.
I do not necessarily subscribe to this position, though I do believe it merits
attention. SeeJacob Nussin, Redistiibution- lechanisms, REV. L. & ECON. (foithcoming).
6 SeeAdler & Sanchirico, sufpra note 1, at Part
III.
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the Authors rightfully claim, are socially costly (e.g., administrative
and compliance costs).
The conclusion the Authors draw from this fact is not entirely
clear. Notwithstanding a few nonconclusive statements, the general
thrust of the the Authors argument is that the indirect route to the ex
post equity-regarding choice-i.e., ex ante valuation supplemented by
costly ex post compensation-is unwarranted. For example, the
Authors do not try to assess the costs of redistributing utilities, or to
counter them with any other opposing force; it would seem that even
the slightest cost of compensation would suffice for rejection of the
compensation route. This Response builds a case for the indirect
route to social welfare via "compensation." It proceeds in four parts.
Part I reveals the costs of the ex post approach and contrasts them
with those of the compensation option. Part II argues that a weaker
condition is required to establish the compensation option, and
hence it incurs even lower costs. Part III is built entirely on separate
work by David Weisbach and myself, and attempts to enrich the
analysis by adding another dimension to it. It shows how the
institutional structure of social policies militates against the ex post
apJroach, and emphasizes the benefits of the compensation scheme.
Part IV adds other considerations supporting the indirect route to the
ex post approach via compensation.

I. THE RELATIVE COSTS OF COMPENSATION
The argument in this Part is constructed in two stages: first, I
argue that the (relative) size of compensation costs is important for
the Authors' argument to hold. If these costs are low enough, an ex
ante approach to social welfare, coupled with ex post compensation is
superior to direct choice of the ex post option. Second, there are
good reasons to believe that compensation costs are relatively low, and
hence the indirect route is preferable.
The starting point is to realize that the ex post approach itself is
inherently costly. If the social choice changes as a result of going
from ex ante to ex post evaluation of social welfare (i.e., due to
divergence), then in terms of ex ante analysis, the ex post approach is
costly. This is straightforward according to the Authors' article. If the
planner's ex post social choice is different from that based on the ex
ante approach, then the former must be inferior under ex ante
analysis. In Part IV, the Authors state this explicitly: an ex post social
choice is ex ante Pareto inferior. That is, the ex ante level of welfare
under an optimal ex post social choice is lower than its level under an
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optimal ex ante social choice. This must be true since these two
choices diverge.
The difference between these welfare levels
represents the social costs of an ex post approach, in terms of an ex
ante evaluation. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of ex ante analysis, a
divergent ex post social choice is costly.
The same explanation can be given for the ex post viewpoint. As
the Authors indicate, ex ante Pareto superiority implies that all
individuals would prefer the ex ante over the ex post perspective.
Assuming individuals' preferences are not equity-regarding, as are
those of the social planner, the ex post option is inferior for each and
every individual in society. Still, the ex post approach might be
socially beneficial due to its distributive effects. The ex post social
choice diverges from the Pareto superior ex ante option when the
social distributive benefit (i.e., equity) outweighs the aggregate
welfare loss due to decreased expected individual utilities. This
potentially outweighed loss is the cost of the ex post option, from the
viewpoint of the ex post approach.7 As long as individual choice can
be represented by expected utility, the ex post methodology of social
welfare is costly in terms of lost utility.
Accordingly, facing uncertainty and equity (or equality)
J)references, the Authors argue, the equity benefits of a divergent ex
post approach can offset the losses in individual expected utilities.
But this cannot be sufficient, since there might be a cheaper way to
accomplish the ex post alternative. Given that the ex post choice is
preferable, there are a few ways of reaching it, two of which are
central: (1) the ex ante social choice accompanied by ex post
compensation; and (2) the direct ex post social choice. Both of these
routes incur social costs, but of different kinds. Therefore, even an ex
post planner cannot discard an ex ante approach-even, say,
utilitarianism-without measuring the adjustment costs to the ex post
choice (i.e., compensation). These costs may prove lower than the
social costs of direct application of an ex post perspective. The mere
costs of compensation cannot rule out an ex ante approach.
What is required is a reliable evaluation technique for these two
kinds of costs. On the compensation side, redistribution of utilities
generally involve redistributing resources (both across individuals and
across states), commonly via taxes and transfers. Redistribution of
utilities probably cannot be fully accomplished through taxes and

7

See also Harel et al., supra note 3, at 62 (arguing fliat reducing variation in utility

distribution costs in average utility).
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transfers, and additional redistribution might potentially be
accomplished through public policies, but the former are the central
means of utilities' redistribution.
Although it is hard to make any general statements about the
relative costs of an ex post perspective, it is generally contended that
the efficiency costs of redistributing via taxation are lower.'
Additionally, there are complexity (i.e., administrative and
compliance) costs.
The complexity costs of redistribution are
probably rather low under the tax-transfer system. As long as the tax
and transfer system exists in any case-for revenue and equity
purposes-its marginal use for compensation is most likely quite
trivial. The additional burden on administration and the public
incurred by the extra redistribution, which is required due to public
policies, is apparently not significant. It may involve increased or
decreased tax rates, adding or eliminating deductions and
exemptions, changing the level of progressivity, etc. In particular, no
major modification of the tax and transfer system is required.
Although it is difficult to assess the general complexity costs of
redistribution by public policies, it should be noted that equityregarding policies tend to be more interventionist. This, in turn,
typically induces higher levels of administrative and compliance
efforts.
Additionally, redistribution through the tax-transfer system
exhibits two additional complexity advantages.
The tax-transfer
system is likely to be better specialized than other public entities in
redistributing utilities in society. Specialization can be translated into
lower complexity costs.' Redistributing utilities ex post through the
tax-transfer system also enjoys economies of scale. That is, it must be
cheaper (in complexity terms) to redistribute utilities once, through
8 In particular, the efficiency costs of the ex post policy evaluation crucially
depend on the policy content-e.g., the policy's means of equating utilities across
individuals and states. These means are supposedly different, for example, under
environmental protection and public education policies.
9 See, e.g., RICHARD ZECKHALSER, USING THE WRONG TOOL: THE
PURSUIT
OF

REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH REGULATION (1981)

(arguing that distributional objectives

are optimally achieved through the tax system alone); Aanund Hylland & Richard
Zeckhauser, Diskibulional Objectives Should A/lct Taxes But Not Program Choice oI Design,
81 SCANDINAIANJ. ECON. 264 (1979) (same); Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Prlevance of/
Distributin and Labor Supply I)istortion
to Government Polity, 18J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159
(2004) (arguing that, in general, distributional concerns should play no role in
evaluating public policies).
10For a similar argument in a different legal setting, see Jacob Nussim and David
Weisbach, The Inlegration o/? Tax and Spending Progrns, 113 YALE LJ. 955, 992-97
(2004).
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one procedure and a single mechanism, than via a multiplicity of
public policies and public agencies. These two complexity advantages
will become clearer later when we discuss the organization of
governmental decision making. '
Thus, there are good reasons to believe that the relative costs of
compensation are generally lower. If this is the case, what would be
our conclusion? Certainly, no rejection of the ex post methodology;
but, then, no recommendation of this methodology to social planners
either. On the contrary, if the ex post approach is appropriate for
social welfare, then it is better realized through an ex ante approach
accompanied by an ex post compensation (i.e., redistribution of
utilities). If the relative costs of compensation are low enough,' 2 this
indirect route to ex post policy evaluation is superior in social welfare
terms. Furthermore, the selected ex ante approach need not be
equity-regarding since in any case its ex post consequences would be
mitigated through compensation. In particular, utilitarianism is not a
bad choice for nontax policy evaluation, even under an ex post
approach.
II.

A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE

According to the Authors, compensation requires redistribution
(i.e., transferability) of utilities along two dimensions:
across
individuals in each potential state of the world, and across states of the
world for each individual. These are sufficient (though probably not
necessary) conditions for the re-convergence of the ex ante and ex
post approaches to social welfare.'3 This Response proposes, however,
that cross-individual transferability of utility is superfluous. That is, if
each kind of transferability condition is costly, the social costs of
convergence are exaggerated by requiring too much.
To demonstrate this, the general construction of the Authors'
argument is first reiterated. W"hen policy consequences are certain, ex
ante and ex post perspectives, and hence social orderings, are
necessarily identical under any kind of social welfare function. Yet,
facing uncertainty, both approaches are necessarily equivalent only
under a utilitarian welfare function, but can diverge under

11 See i{fia, Part III.
12As pointed out above, these costs are also sensitive to the ability to
redistribute
utility through taxes and transfers.
1 Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 1, at Part II.
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nonutilitarian social preferences. 14 Since utilitarianism is indifferent
to equity, it is inappropriate for social policy analysis. In conclusion,
in the face of policy uncertainty, and given equity-regarding social
preferences, ex ante and ex post social choices are not necessarily
equivalent. Accordingly, two distributional conditions lead to this
conclusion: the distribution of utilities across individuals (i.e., equity)
and across states (i.e., uncertainty). For example, if both distributions
are equalized-i.e., perfect equality exists across individuals and
certainty-ex ante and ex post approaches converge, irrespectively of
social preferences. Apparently, this is the Authors' intuitive source for
the double transferability conditions. That is, if utility can be freely
transferred across individuals and across states, both of these
distributions can be equalized (or at least controlled ex post).
However, transferability across states of the world alone is enough
(i.e., a sufficient condition) for convergence between ex ante and ex
post approaches. If utility is freely transferred across states for each
individual, uncertainty is eliminated, and no divergence is possible.
In the absence of uncertainty, ex ante expected outcomes are
identical to ex post actual outcomes. Any equity consideration would
be equally relevant under both ex ante and ex post analysis.I
In
logical terms, uncertainty is a necessary condition for divergence, and
hence certainty is a sufficient condition for its removal-i.e.,
convergence.
Therefore, the compensation option demands redistribution of
utilities only across states of the world, and not across individuals.
That is, the costs of compensation are even lower, and hence the case
for the indirect route to ex post policy evaluation is reinforced.
III. DECENTRALIZED POLICYMAKING
In reality, public policy is not made by a single person in
government. Policymaking is decentralized
throughout
the
organization of government. Any recommended methodology of
public policy assessment is directed toward multiple entities within the
governmental organization, at various levels-e.g., politicians,

14John C. Harsanyi, (ardinal W/ela/e, Individualislic Ehics, and
Inler)ersonal
Comarisons (Y'
Uility, 63J. POL. ECON. 309, 316 (1955).
1) Indeed, free transferability of utilities across individuals may also be sufficient if
we agree to adopt Utilitarianism as the non-equity-regarding social welfare approach.
When utilities are freely transferred across individuals, equity concerns are costlessly
removed.
Uncertainty concerns are then neutralized, rather than removed, by
adopting utilitarian preferences.
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committee members, public officials, and bureaucrats. Appreciating
the dispersion of policymaking within the public sector crucially
affects the choice between the two routes investigated here: the ex
post perspective versus the ex ante approach complemented by
compensation.
This Part draws on ongoing research by David
Weisbach and myself, and argues that the latter route is preferable in
a decentralized policymaking society.
There

are

various

justifications

for

decentralized

public

policylfaking, and numerous explanations for the tendency of
governmental organizations to decentralize policymaking authority.
These issues have been studied by scholars in such diverse disciplines

as public administration, sociology, psychology, economics,

and

political science. This voluminous literature is discussed elsewhere.

In general, this literature indicates a number of reasons for
decentralization or delegation of policymaking:
in particular,
specialization, 6 bounded rationality, 17 and agency problems. 8 The
political structures and relationships-House and Senate, committees,
subcommittees,

decentralization.

agencies,

etc.-demonstrate

significant

The tasks of devising, detailing, and implementing

public policies are allocated among different entities. Delegation is
observed across federal levels-federation, states, cities, counties-and

along various public issues-such as environment, welfare, personal
safety, etc. Further, within each governmental entity, responsibility is
delegated to various individuals. The theory of organizations also
indicates that decentralization of tasks and information is limited,
inter alia, by coordination difficulties. Synchronizing dispersed actors
16See, e.g., Luther Gulick, Notes on the TheotyQ

(Organization, in PAPERS ON THE
1 (Luther Gulick & L. Urwick eds., 1937) (exemplifying
the benefits and effects of specialization within organizations); HERBERT A. SIMON ET
AL., PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 158 (1950) (same).
17 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY
OF DECISIONSCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION

PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
(1957)
(building his
organizational theor y on precepts of bounded rationality); Raaj K Sah & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, The Achieclureo/ Economic Systems: Iliwnvchies and Polywies, 76 AM. ECON.
RnV. 716 (1986) (showing how the organizational design affects its output when
individuals err).
is See, e.g., Anthony Downs, A Theoty o/'Bureaucuacy, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 439 (1965)
MAKING

(establishing a theory of bureaucratic behavior based in part on self interest); WILLIAM
36-42 (1971) (arguing
that bureaucrats seek public reputation, power, salary, large budget); Bengt
Holmstrom, Moral Ilazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. OF ECON. 324 (1982) (showing how
competition among agents can be beneficial in revealing information); JONATHAN
BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT (1985) (arguing that
redundancy in public administration can be beneficial).
NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOvERNMENT
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or decision units is costly, and hence constrains the extent of
delegation in organizations. The value of agency multiplicity (e.g.,
specialization, competition, redundancy) is traded off against its
triggered coordination costs.
Thus, mis-coordination among
governmental agencies, as well as among corporate divisions or
workers, is expected; and examples of mis-coordination are
abundant.'
Thus, the design and implementation of public policy is
decentralized through multiple public agencies and officials, which
are generally not well coordinated.
This means that no single
policymaker can see the whole picture-i.e., social welfare function.
In particular, uncertainty about any single public policy is only one
(arguably minor) part of social welfare uncertainty; and the case is
similar for the distribution of utilities generated by a single policy.
Clearly, then, it is wrong to speak of a particular policy as being
equitable or inequitable.
Consider the following example. Assume three uncertain public
policies-I, II and Ill-which affect the utility of two individuals (U,V)
under two possible states of the world-a and b.

State a
State b

I

II

III

(100, 300)
(500,200)

(300, 100)
(200, 500)

(150, 150)
(300, 300)

Assume one policymaker is required to choose between policies I
and III and the other between II and III. If both policymakers follow
an ex post methodology of social welfare assessment, they may both
prefer III over I or II. But these decisions are socially wrong in welfare

1 See,

e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 263-65 (2004) (describing how a lack of

coordination

among

U.S.

governmental

Vulnerability to terrorist attack);

agencies

HAROLD SEIDMAN

contributed

to

the

States'

& ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS,

POSITION, AND POWER 119-35 (1970) (describing the Reagan administration's
transition to an unprecedented centralized decision-making organizational structure);
Edward T. Jennings & Dale Krane, (oordinaliun and Wel/ase Re/nn: The Quest Jar Ihe
Pl/ilosoher's Stoe, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 341, 396 (1994) (identifying barriers to
coordination in the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills program); B. Guy Peters,
MaragingIlorizonlal Goaerninent: The Polilics / 'Coordination,76 PUB. ADMIN. 295, 303
(1998) (discussing potential failures of coordination by networks); Dominic Stead,
Transfpoi and Land-use PlanningPoli3 : Peally foined tp?, 55 INT'L SOC. ScI.J. 333, 393
(2003) (finding a lack of integration between land-use planning and transportation
policy);Janet A. Weiss, Pathways to CoerationAmaog Public Agecies, 7J. POL'YANALYSIS
& MGMT. 94, 95-98 (1987) (reporting on problems of organizational cooperation with
the public school systel).
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terms. Choosing I and II is superior to choosing III twice under any
equity-regarding social welfare function. That is:

State a
State b

1+11
(400,400)
(700, 700)

111+111
(300, 300)
(600, 600)

In fact, this example is quite obviously idealized, since the
consequences of policies I and II are perfectly and negatively
correlated. However, this argument holds, in general, for two or more
nonperfectly correlated policies. As long as some public policies are

not perfectly correlated, separate and uncoordinated ex post
valuation of each may produce an inferior welfare outcome overall (as
evaluated by an ex post methodology).
This is actually a
diversification argument applied to social-policy risks. Like financial
portfolios, the value of diversification
increases as positive correlation
• . 20
among uncertain choices diminishes.
In the social welfare sphere
the intuition is similar, however it is the correlation in utilities'
distributions which is of interest.
Are social policies perfectly and positively correlated? Apparently
not. There is no reason to believe that the distributions of utilities
induced by different policies follow a similar pattern in any way. The
information gathered by different agencies and its analysis is not
usually similar; the preferences of various decisionmakers may differ;
the subject matter of social policy (e.g., environmental vs. educational
vs. security) is seemingly unrelated; different politicians/ policymakers
serve various clienteles and hence the benefits of different policies
flow to diverse social, geographical, and economic groups; all of the
above factors can change over time, possibly creating intertemporal
differences in utilities' distributions 1
To conclude, a separate ex post analysis of each social policy is
inadequate.
A comprehensive, all-inclusive ex post analysis is
required, but this is not possible in reality. Governments cannot
20

See, e.g.,

RICHARD A. BREALEYAND STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

FINANCE 153-80 (6th ed. 2000) (showing that diversification reduces variability and

hence portfolio risk).
2 This naturally raises the question of when is "ex post" realized?
The relevant
future moment of "ex post" should be determined somehow. Answering this question
is inmportant under both ex ante and ex post perspectives.

20071

A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO WELFARISM

evaluate all policies in tandem. So what can be done? The resulting
all-inclusive

distribution

can be fixed

ex post by redistributing

utilities-i.e., compensation. Thus, ex post compensation can serve to
facilitate valuable coordination among policies.
But then, if
compensation is employed, an ex ante approach can be adopted. In
particular, utilitarianism
cannot be ruled out as a guiding principle
S22
for policymakers.

A second conclusion drawn from the theory and practice of
organizations is that public policies are allocated to various agencies,
each specializing in a particular public issue, generally unrelated to

equity (e.g., environment, security, agriculture). But then, equityi.e., distribution of utilities-is not common knowledge. It requires
expertise in equity as well,2 which by their very nature specialized
agencies do not possess. A housing agency does not necessarily have
anything to do with equity. It specializes in housing. Specializing in
equity issues would be wasteful for these agencies, and for that very
reason the government-like other organizations-is structured
according to expertise. Specializing in equity would necessarily hurt
agencies' expertise in their subject matter, and accordingly impair
their nonequity performance. '
Therefore, it is conceivable that equity also requires
organizational specialization. The tax-transfer system or a "welfare
department", arguably, is, or can be perceived as, an equity-specialized
agency. If specialization in equity is indeed valuable enough that a
separate agency or a group of policymakers is allocated for it, social
equity would be applied separately from other public policies. ' That
is, most policymakers should be guided by a nonequity-regarding
welfare function. In particular, utilitarianism cannot be excluded.

IV. ACCURACY, POLICY CONSTRAINTS, AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY
There are further arguments in favor of an ex ante approach
supplemented by compensation. First, it seems that compensation2 Actually, under certain plausible assumptions, utilitarianism is superior
to any
ex ante equity-regarding welfare function for the same reason. The distibution of the
expected utilities of a single policy is meaningless.
That is, equity-regarding
preferences, in general, are unsuitable for decentralized policymaking, as long as ex
post compensation is not excessively costly.
23,
Expertise in equity includes, inter alia, the collection of relevant information, its
measurement, its analysis, and making decisions that fit results.
24Yet, though a housing agency is no expert in redistributing utilities, it may
enjoy
a superior expertise in measuring individuals' utility from housing.
2) (/ Adler & Sanchirico, supa note 1, at 329-30.
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i.e., ex post redistribution of utilities-is required anyway under the
ex post approach, mainly due to the cost of information. Policies are
selected ex ante based on information about the future. Production
of information is costly; in particular, information relating to future
utilities of a country's population is very costly. The other side of the
coin is accuracy: cheaper information is less accurate. Accordingly,
the choice of policies ex ante can be mistaken due to inaccurate
information.
Actually, optimality necessarily dictates a certain
number of errors in policy choice. Such mistakes-in particular,
those relating to distribution of utilities-can be fixed ex post through
compensation. The costs of ex post compensation versus the costs of
error (or the production of extra information ex ante) have to be
weighed: if the former cost is (relatively) small, applying ex post
compensation is socially valuable.
There are good reasons to believe that this is actually the case.
The costs of information production are probably quite high, not only
I)ecause of the difficulties in predicting future consequences, but also
due to interdependencies within the government. As explained
above, public policy is decentralized throughout the government.
The outcomes of any particular public policy may depend, inter alia,
on other public policies and choices.
Land use policies are
interrelated with transportation policies, and both are interconnected
with environmental policies. Since policy choices are decentralized
and barely coordinated, errors in estimation (of ex post distributions)
are difficult (i.e., expensive) to avoid. On the other hand, ex post
compensation is, as explained above, relatively cheap. First, this is due
to specialization in utilities' distribution. Second, economies of scale
indicate that a single unified action of utilities redistribution is
probably cheaper than multiple endeavors by separate agencies.
Another possible motivation for ex post compensation is potential
constraints on the design and implementation of public policies.
Even if all policies are selected according to an equity-regarding ex
post welfare function, the resulting distribution of equities might be
limited. Public policies are constrained to a larger extent in their
spectrum of potential utilities distribution.
For example,
environmental protection policy can prohibit production by a plant
polluting a poor neighborhood, but it may not be able to force it to
26 The

first difficulty inheres in identifying all possible (or at least, the important)
future states of the world, and measuring the effect of a public policy in each. Second,
the separate and composite reaction of individuals should then be evaluated, as should
its effect on the distribution of utilities.
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relocate to a rich area. If the resulting distribution of utilities is
limited, additional redistribution ex post might be socially beneficial.
If compensation is required anyway, either due to error fixing or
constrained policies, and assuming the marginal costs of
compensation are not excessive, equity can be dispensed with in
policy design. Any non-equity-regarding welfare evaluation-whether
under an ex ante or ex post approach-is appropriate as long as ex
post compensation is employed. Again, in particular, utilitarianism is
also acceptable.
Finally, ex post compensation is valuable since it allows for an ex
ante Pareto superior choice of social welfare. It permits choices of
policies that would be unanimously supported.' This issue of political
acceptability or public choice relates to the discussion of the costs of
the ex post approach, above. It is actually a similar argument, used
for different purposes.
To sum up, the appropriate perspective of social welfare is
indeterminate. Uncertainty and equity preferences trigger a social
dilemma of ex ante versus ex post perspectives. Yet, policymakers
should not on the whole be concerned with this social choice. As long
as compensation-i.e., redistribution of utilities-is a viable and
valuable
option,
policymaking
may
ignore
the dilemma.
Compensation is a viable option even though it sustains social costs.
There is good reason to believe these costs are relatively low.
Furthermore, utilities' redistribution is largely feasible through special
redistributive systems-i.e., taxes and transfers. 8 Compensation is
valuable for various reasons. It saves on individual utilities. It better
coordinates decentralized policymaking.
It promotes valuable
specialization in social policy production. It allows for economies of
scale in achieving equity. It improves accuracy. Therefore, only a very
restricted branch of governnment-i.e., the tax-transfer systen-still
faces the dilemma presented by the Authors. The rest of the
governmental organization is unconstrained by it. However, this does
not necessarily mean that any (benevolent) social welfare ordering is
proper for policymaking. It implies that nontax policymakers should
adopt a Pareto superior welfare ordering, while ignoring equity
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SeeAdler & Sanchirico, supra note 1, at 331-34.
Indeed, to the extent that specific components of utilities are nontransferable

through the tax-transfer system and cannot be compensated for (e.g., certain health
conditions), and they can be redistributed through other public policies, these policies
may be guided by ai ex post perspective after all.
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consequences.
In particular, utilitarianism is an option, and an
acceptable guide for policymakers.

29 This result should not be confused with Musgrave's analytical separation
of the
allocation and distribution branches of government. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE
THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 3-22 (1959).
Indeed, allocation (i.e., efficiency) and
distribution (i.e., equity) are not independent tasks of government. But their joint
impleLentation should not be applied by each and every unit of government.

